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The In-Vessel corium Retention (IVR) through the External Reactor Vessel Cooling (ERVC) 
is mean for maintaining the reactor vessel integrity during a severe accident, by cooling and retaining 
the molten material inside the reactor vessel. By doing this, significant portion of severe accident 
negative phenomena connected with reactor vessel failure could be avoided.  
In this paper, analysis of NPP Krško applicability for IVR strategy was performed. It includes 
overview of performed plant related analysis with emphasis on wet cavity modification, plant’s site 
specific walk downs, new applicable probabilistic and deterministic analysis, evaluation of new 
possibilities for ERVC strategy implementation regarding plant’s post-Fukushima improvements and 
adequacy with plant’s procedures for severe accident mitigation. 
Conclusion is that NPP Krško could perform in-vessel core retention by applying external 
reactor vessel cooling strategy with reasonable confidence in success. Per probabilistic and 
deterministic analysis, time window for successful ERVC strategy performance for most dominating 
plant damage state scenarios is 2.5 hours, when onset of core damage is observed. This action should 
be performed early after transition to Severe Accident Management Guidance’s (SAMG).  For loss 
of all AC power scenario, containment flooding could be initiated before onset of core damage within 
related emergency procedure. To perform external reactor vessel cooling, reactor water storage tank 
gravity drain with addition of alternate water is needed to be injected into the containment. ERVC 
strategy will positively interfere with other severe accident strategies. There are no negative effects 
due to ERVC performance. New flooding level will not threaten equipment and instrumentation 
needed for long term SAMGs performance and eventually diluted containment sump borated water 
inventory will not cause return to criticality during eventual recirculation phase due to the lost core 
geometry. 
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If a severe accident involving core damage is not arrested, at some point relocation of molten 
core material into the lower plenum of reactor vessel will occur. Reactor vessel integrity can be 
maintained by performing external reactor vessel cooling by retaining the molten material inside the 
reactor vessel, therefore avoiding significant severe accident negative phenomena connected with 
reactor vessel failure, such as: 
 evaporation of water which is in contact with molten core debris which could result in 
containment overpressure; 
 generation of additional flammable gases, as a consequence of molten core - concrete 
interaction (MCCI), which could threaten the containment; 
 non-condensable gaseous buildup, as a consequence of MCCI, which could result in 
containment overpressure; 
 additional radioactive aerosol production; 
 reactor cavity steam explosions; 
 basement floor concrete ablation, as a consequence of MCCI, which can threaten 
containment integrity;  
 direct containment heating as a result of high pressure melt ejection of corium; and 
 other accident phenomena connected with degradation of overall plant capabilities to 
mitigate the post-accident site releases and to restore controllable accident condition. 
In case when ERVC performance is not successful to prevent reactor pressure vessel (RPV) 
failure, it will slow down boil off of reactor inventory, thus delaying the time of vessel failure. Gaining 
time could be crucial because it may be able to restore failed equipment back to service. 
 
 
2 EVALUATION OF ERVC APPLICABILITY FOR NPP KRŠKO  
An evaluation of current evidence, site specific analysis, and area of improvement in equipment 
and guidelines for IVR as an accident management strategy for NPP Krško will be presented. Also 
an overview of ERVC strategy for severe accident will be made. Areas of interest are: 
 evaluation of NPP Krško current possibility for external reactor vessel cooling as a mean 
for severe accident mitigation, and 
 eventual improvement of current “wet cavity” design and overall plant capabilities 
during accident mitigation. 
Results of performed NPP Krško reactor cavity walkdown will be discussed and incorporated 
into the overall findings and conclusions. 
 
 
2.1 Description of external reactor vessel cooling 
The external reactor vessel cooling (ERVC) goal is to cool the RPV lower head from the 
outside. The objective is to prevent the RPV failure.  As long as this objective is met, core debris 
remains inside RPV and therefore limits containment loads during severe accident. The goal can be 
satisfied by timely submerging the RPV lower head to a height some margin above the level which 
the core debris will reach inside the vessel following relocation from the original core boundaries. 
Nucleate boiling occurring on the outside vessel wall following core melt relocation will then remove 
sufficient heat from the debris to prevent vessel wall melt through. 
Any actions required to achieve the flooding must be performed within a time window defined 
by the time interval between the start of the SAMG operations (i.e., Core Exit Thermocouple (CET) 
temperature > 650 °C (925 K)) and the predicted time of lower support plate failure, for the severe 
accidents under consideration. 
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In the long term, it is also necessary to compensate for the steaming due to the decay heat. For 
successful ERVC, focusing effect is on contact of metallic pool layer with RPV wall. It is expected 
that RPV wall on position 90 degrees will have the highest temperature and the creep deformation 
will lead to wall thickness reduction with partial wall melting. It will be potentially failure position 
of RPV, as seen in Figure 1.  The focusing effect can be much reduced if the upper face of the metal 
layer is cooled on top (an example is injection into the core, spraying the upper portions of RPV from 
outside, or hot gases circulation with partial heat transfer to steam generators). 
 
 
Figure 1: Basic principle and heat removal process of ERVC [1] 
 
Once as successful ERVC strategy of vessel cooling has established IVR, heat removal from 
the containment stays crucial for long term severe accident mitigation. 
 
 
2.2 History of ERVC development for NPP Krško  
 
IPE Level 2  
 
Summarized NPP Krško Individual Plant Examination (IPE) Level 2 [2] results based on the 
studies, experiments and analysis [3], represented that by performing ERVC strategy the heat 
transferred by nuclear boiling on the outer head wall surface can remove a large amount of heat, and 
that may be enough to prevent failure of the vessel wall due to melted corium thermal attack during 
the severe accident.  
It was also concluded that if the reactor vessel could be timely flooded, this measure could 
prevent vessel failure in case of severe accident with relocated core. More practical considerations 
for NPP Krško included in [2] were:  
 proposal of “wet cavity” modification at the plant by allowing free communication of 
water from the lower compartments to the RPV cavity, which will be beneficial to cool 
the debris if the vessel will fail, and 
 with “wet cavity” design injection of total RWST volume would not flood the lower 
portion of the Krško vessel. Therefore, an accident management strategy to attempt to 
prevent vessel failure by IVR would require additional water to be injected into the 
containment than expected due to safeguards system operation. 
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In view of mounting evidences, it was recommended that NPP Krško considers vessel flooding 
as an ERVC severe accident strategy at a future date. 
 
 
NPP Krško reactor cavity flooding evaluation  
 
In the Reactor Cavity Flooding Evaluation Report [4] it was investigated and justified the 
flooding of the region below the reactor vessel as a means to mitigate a severe accident, and at the 
same time ensuring that such flooding will not have negative impacts on design basis accidents or on 
normal operations. The two main goals of RPV cavity flooding function were:  
 containment floor concrete protection, and  
 external RPV cooling.  
   An additional goal can is achieved when satisfying the main goals: scrubbing of fission 
product aerosols released from ex-vessel core debris. 
 
 
NPP Krško wet cavity modification 
 
Based on findings from [4], NPP Krško performed during 2001. modification 347-FD-L 
“Containment sump check valve removal”, where wet cavity design is adopted by simple removal of 
check valve, as seen in Figure 2. The modification requirements included external reactor vessel 
cooling analysis. 
The objective of performing this modification would be to mitigate the consequences of a 
potential severe accident by: 
 ensuring the presence of water in the cavity in the event of reactor vessel failure and 
core debris transport to the reactor cavity, to quench and cool the core debris, and 
thereby prevent the occurrence of long term molten core-concrete interactions, 
 flood the outside of the reactor vessel before core melt relocation to the lower head, and 
thereby potentially prevent the failure of the reactor vessel, and 
 to ensure an overlying water layer if core debris does enter the containment, to scrub 
fission products released from the debris. 
 
 
Figure 2: Containment sump check valve removal by plant modification 347-FD-L 
Regarding that during wet cavity modification RWST was only source for containment 
injection, and analysis limitations for timely performance of ERVC strategy were applied, the RPV 
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external cooling strategy was not implemented, despite deterministic benefits. Modification was 
accepted only for cavity floor concrete protection. See sections 3.8 and 3.9. 
 
3 REQUIREMENTS AND LIMITATIONS FOR ERVC STRATEGY 
PERFORMANCE 
 
3.1 Containment water level needed for IVR 
The cavity water level shall be at least at the melted core level inside the RPV which is 1m 
above the RV Lower Head Bottom (inside RPV) plus a margin of 0.5 meter (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3:  NPP Krško in-vessel corium pool geometry calculation [3] 
 
This corresponds to a water height at elevation 99.2 m or approximately 152 m3 of water in the 






































Free Volume (m3) WITH RV Cavity (Table
9)
Free Volume (m3) without RV Cavity (Table
8)RWST + RCS + 2 Accu Volume = 1360
m3
RWST Volume = 1136
m3RV Weld Position = 99.360
m
Required Volume to Reach RV Weld = 1507
m398.500 m 99.015 m
RV Bottom Required Volume to Reach RV Bottom 783
m3
 
Figure 4: NPP Krško RB flooding level evaluation [4] 
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In Figure 4 and Table 1 are represented NPP Krško containment water volumes, elevations and 
plant instrumentation measured levels. Information’s are collected from [4], [9], and [10]. 
Table 1: NPP Krško containment volumes, elevations, measured water levels 









(sp. - setpoint) 
92.080 m -  RB sump bottom 
93.410 m -  Containment sump bottom 
93.560 m - 0 m Containment recirculation sump level - bottom 
LI 6102 / LI 6102  
94.460 m - 0.9 m Cavity floor bottom 
95.500 m  75 m3 1.94 m Cavity concrete protection (SP – 2 m) 
97.110 m - 3.55 m* Minimum recirc. sump operability water level 
*with  (+) 0.3 m for EOP / SAMG sp.= 3.9 m 
97.660 m 784 m3 4.10 m Bottom of the RPV 
98.500 m 1136 m3 4.94 m** 1. RWST useful volume 
2. Flood level elevation FR-Z.2 
**with (-) 0.3 m for EOP sp.= 4.6 m 
Ventilation opening to cavity (bottom) 
99.015 m 1360 m3 5.45 m RWST + RCS + 2 SI ACC water volume 
Ventilation opening (top) 
99.160 m 1440 m3 5.60 m RPV external cooling SP 
99.360 m 1507 m3 5.80 m RPV weld 
99.560 m - 6 m Containment recirculation sump level - top 
LI 6102 / LI 6103  
 
 
3.2 RPV cavity flooding flowpath 
Currently reactor cavity flooding in NPP Krško is performed through one 4 inch floor drain line 
(Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5: RPV cavity floor drain opening protected with sieve (marked) 
Afterwards, when containment level is sufficient high, water can enter through reactor 
compartment ventilation ducts (Figure 6). Therefore there are no flow limitations for timely 
performance of the cavity flooding strategy regarding containment to reactor cavity compartment 
injection.  
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Figure 6: Reactor compartment ventilation entry 
 
3.3 Containment equipment flooding limitations 
Regarding beyond design basis accidents and already adopted NPP Krško SAMG strategies 
[18], equipment flooding is predicted per SAMG [8] (see Table 2), where detailed information of 
potential effected equipment were made (as seen in Table 1). 
Table 2: NPP Krško SAMG, SAG-8 Attachment “Loss of equipment and instrumentation”, detail 
 
Negative Impacts for Injecting Into the Containment 





























































































Affected instruments by additional flooding over el. 98.5 m (FR-Z.2) [21], [10] are part of 
reactor coolant drain tank (RCDT) flow measurement instrumentation, which are not necessary for 
containment sump recirculation, and are not essential for any further SAMGs strategy performance. 
 
 
3.4 Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) issue for reactor vessel  
In order to assure structural integrity of the Krško RPV for a postulated external flooding event, 
a stress and fracture mechanics analysis was performed (ref. [3], [4]), reflecting enveloping conditions 
in terms of internal pressure and temperature, and external temperature. The structural analysis 
focused on stability of postulated defects using fracture mechanics methods that are typically applied 
to demonstrate RPV integrity under PTS (Pressurized Thermal Shock) type of loading. Conclusion 
from [4] is that plant modifications, which allows vessel flooding to mitigate a severe accident, could 
not lead to PTS caused catastrophic vessel failure in case of vessel flooding during normal operation 




3.5 Reactor vessel insulation water ingression 
NPP Krško IPE documentation suggests that NPP Krško reflective reactor vessel insulation 
would not impede the ingression of water needed for successful ERVC. The experiments referenced 
in plant specific IPE Level 2 [3] and EPRI [11] also show no effect of reflective insulation, with 
sustained nucleate boiling being maintained in cases performed with and without insulation. 
Figures 7, 8 and 9, represents reactor cavity walkdown photos of NPP Krško reactor vessel 
bottom head insulation details.  
 
 
Figure 7: NPP Krško RPV insulation details (1) - inspection openings  
 
Document Final Independent Review of NPP Krško Design Modification Package [14] 
reviewed plant modification 347-FD-L “Containment sump check valve removal”. The conclusions 
are in accordance with findings from [4]. This report as a new input defines minimum water in-flow 
for successful ERVC strategy performance (8 m3/hr). According to [3], various experimental 
evidences exist that insulation would not impede the ingression of water because it is not watertight. 
 
 
Figure 8: NPP Krško RPV insulation details (2) – incore penetrations 
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Figure 9: NPP Krško RPV insulation details (4) – insulation - concrete gap 
 
Regarding plant specific IPE Level 2 analysis [2], and EPRI SAMG TBR generic 
documentation [11] – additional insulation openings for NPP Krško are not needed. 
 
 
3.6 Steam explosions 
Steam Explosions phenomena for NPP Krško are addressed in phenomenological evaluation 
[3], and site specific report [24]. Approaches to the issue of steam explosions which have been used 
in various analyses have also been reviewed.  
Based on the reviews, evaluations and caluculated results, ex vessel steam explosion, as a result 
of eventual vessel failure into the flooded reactor cavity, will cause no additional challenges to the 
containment integrity since: 
 for containment pressurization due to steam generation, the potential for steam 
explosions has no impact, and  
 ex vessel steam explosion shock waves  during eventual vessel failure scenarios pose 
neglible threat to containment integrity. 
 
 
3.7 Recriticality during severe accident conditions  
Partially diluted or unborated containment sump water inventory, will not cause return to 
criticality of molten core debris during in-vessel recirculation phase or eventual ex-vessel quenching, 
because of lost core geometry [7]. 
 
 
3.8 Time window requirements for ERVC strategy performance 
For successful ERVC strategy performance, flooding must be performed within a time window 
defined by the time interval between the start of the SAMG operations (i.e., Core Exit Thermocouple 
temperature > 650 °C) and the predicted time of lower support plate failure. 
The time window was identified as follows [4]: 
 Severe accident sequences to be considered are identified based on Plant Damage States 
(PDS). Damage states participating for the most dominating Core Damage Frequency 
(CDF) are considered for the time window calculation.  
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 For most dominant damage states, where ERVC usage is reasonable, the accident 
sequence analysis from the level 2 study was used to determine the time window 
between the Core Exit Thermocouple reaching 650 °C and the predicted time of core 
lower support plate failure (corresponding to the time of core melt relocation to the 
lower head). 
 The minimum time window for most dominant PDS is selected. The results of this 
process are summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3 represents MAAP calculated NPP Krško PDS scenarios with dedicated time for ERVC. 
Calculated time for ERVC performance (criterion per [4]), for successfully strategy performance is 
2.5 hours for TEHNNN plant damage state (PDS) scenario (58% of total CDF participation - as was 
used for design of passive containment filtered vent system (PCFV) [20]). 





















Minimum time for  
ERVC performance  
1) (B) - (A) [4] 
hours (h) 
TEHNNN 58,18% 6463 15472 21767 2,5 h 
TEHANN 7,46% 6463 15472 21767 2,5 h ** 
TEHAYN 5,45% 1920 9183 13429 2,0 h 
UXXXXB 2,95% 6680 16096 20546 2,5 h 
SELAYN 2,76% 15298 31205 37579 4,2 h 
WUUUUB 0,90% 69529 79687 84700 2,7 h 
* After core uncovers, roughly 250 to 500 seconds (depending on overall scenario length) is needed 
that CET rises from 370 deg. C (saturation water temperature), to 650 deg. C (SAMG entry). 
Assumption is based on similar results from [4]. 
** TEHANN scenario differs from TEHNNN regarding containment injection after vessel failure. 
Therefore TEHANN results for in-vessel accident progression are the same as TEHNNN. 
 
It should be noted that first Reactor Cavity Flooding Evaluation Report [4] (with too 
conservative result with time window for vessel flooding of 30 minutes) took into account only PSA 
results for specific, worst case (fastest) PDS scenario, and this was chosen to give a judgment for 
adoption of ERVC strategy. Deterministic benefits from appliance of ERVC strategy were not used. 
Meanwhile, NEK PSA model [15] was updated with initiating events for: internal flooding, internal 
fires, seismic events, high energy line breaks (HELB), and other external events. Recent codes 
calculation of accident scenarios are using different severe accident phenomenology, where some of 
effects have changed the accident sequences and overall results (as hot leg creep rupture effect which 
happens before high pressure vessel failure, which enables safety injection accumulators to be 
injected into the RPV, thus postponing time of vessel failure).  
For further development, if early depressurization of RCS is performed before core damage (or 
when it is noted that core damage is imminent), or when still in EOP procedure, for TEHNNN PDS 
scenario for the time from CET > 650 °C and the predicted time of lower support plate failure extends 
time window for ERVC performance for additional 1 hour. Also, with early EOP flooding action, 
ERVC successful performance time window per criteria [4] could be extended to at least 4 hours [25]. 
 
M. Mihalina, S. Špalj, B. Glaser, External Reactor Vessel Cooling Evaluation for Severe Accident Mitigation in NPP Krško, Journal of Energy, vol. 65-2 




3.9 Curent plant availability for ERVC performance 
For ERVC performance water inventory needed is 1440 m3, to cover bottom of reactor vessel 
up to elevation 99.2 m (or 5,6 m on containment recirculation sump level indication). 
Current Refueling Water Storage Tank inventory (RWST) inventory (1250 m3), together with 
spilled RCS and SI ACC (226 m3), is not sufficient for performance of IVR strategy. Nevertheless, 
after performing post-Fukushima short term improvement plant modifications [5], [6], NPP Krško is 
available to inject additional water (see Table 5) into the containment through alternate flowpaths 
(containment spray lines, ECCS flowpath, RCP fire protection spray lines), including mobile 
equipment usage.  
Injecting RWST up to main control room “RWST Empty” alarm (18%) [21] will inject 1110 
m3 of water. Basis for that alarm is that RWST vortexing regarding ECCS PMP operation will be 
prevented (if later in the accident they will become available). Also, for core damage to occur, core 
should remain “dry”, and it can be supposed that RCS has been spilled via PRZR safety / relief valve 
or through the RCS break (assuming the brake from RCS is spilled into the containment). RCS spilled 
total volume is roughly 226 m3, including the accumulators. Together with RWST it would be 1360 
m3. Nevertheless by conservative assumption that RCS may spilled through IS LOCA or through SG 
tube rupture, this volume will not be taken into the account for ERVC purposes for flooding the 
containment. 
NPP Krško current means for containment injection are: 
 RWST gravity drain (1250 m3) or RWST injection (1010 m3) with ECCS or Containment 
Spray System to “RWST Empty” alarm (18%) 
AND 
 additional 190 m3 (430 m3) needed to be injected by severe accident management equipment 
(SAME): 
 mobile AE900PMP-001/002 (FOX3) pump with capacity 96 m3/h at 10 bar, 
 mobile AE900PMP-007 (HS450) pump with capacity 660 m3/h at 12 bar. 
 It should be noted that for Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP), containment flooding strategy 
by RWST gravity drain is currently performed within EOP “Loss of all AC power” procedure (before 
core damage). Applicable water sources are in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: NPP Krško available water sources for inject into the containment (SAMG / EOP usage) 
Source Capacity Water quality 
RWST tank  1250 m3 borated 
BAT tank (2)  51 m3 borated 
WT tank 01 379 m3 demineralized 
WT tank 02 1000 m3 demineralized 
CY tanks (2) 879 m3 each demineralized 
PW tanks (2) 1000 m3 each demineralized 
FP tank 235 m3 raw water 
City water unlimited raw water 
Condenser hotwell not defined raw water 
CW tunnel not defined raw water 
Sava river  unlimited raw water 
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4 SEVERE ACCIDENTS MEASURES UPGRADE REGARDING ERVC 
PERFORMANCE 
Severe accident assumes occurrence of a meltdown of the core, breaching the first barrier of 
the clad to release the radioactive fission products. If the accident progress further, the molten corium 
moves to the bottom head of the vessel. The bottom head will fail if the corium melt remains uncooled, 
thereby failing the second barrier to the release of radioactivity to the environment. The corium melt 
released to the containment may fail the containment in a short time if some energetic reactions, for 
example, hydrogen burn (detonation), steam explosion, or if direct containment heating occurs. If 
such energetic interactions do not occur, or are managed not to occur, the containment could fail later 
(by several hours or few days) due to the attack of the core melt on the concrete, which would release 
the non-condensable gases pressurizing the containment and possibility cause the melt-through of the 
basement. The containment structural failure represents failure of the third and the last barrier to the 
release of radioactivity to the environment. 
Severe accident management guidelines (SAMGs) consist of actions (measures) that would 
prevent the failure of the barriers 1 (cladding), 2 (reactor pressure vessel) to 3 (containment). The 
first aim of SAMG is to prevent damage to the clad on the uranium fuel pellets.  
This should be done by operator actions from severe accident control room guidance initial 
response, or after Technical Support Centre (TSC) becomes operable - by injecting into the secondary 
side, by depressurizing RCS and by injecting into the reactor vessel [8]. 
If that is not possible due to the inability to timely inject water to the vessel, the second barrier 
protection aim of SAMGs should become the prevention of the bottom head of the RPV by 
performing ERVC strategy. If that aim is not achieved due to either the inability of inject water to the 
vessel to quench and the melt pool in the lower head; the next (third) aim becomes prevention of the 
failure of the containment due to gaseous buildup, and/or the basement melt-through so that there is 
no significant release of radioactivity to the environment.  
NPP Krško uses as a last mean for containment protection SAMGs severe challenge 
guidelines where usage of dedicated equipment is introduced from Phase 1 Safety Upgraded Project 
(SUP) implementation [6], [8]: 
 Passive Autocatalytic Recombiners (PAR) - for mitigation of containment severe 
challenge due to buildup of flammable gases in containment, and  
 Passive Containment Filtered Vent System (PCFV) for mitigation of containment 
overpressure severe challenges. 
 
 
4.1 NPP Krško EOP Upgrades 
Accident sequence with high contributing core damage frequency in PSA is loss of AC power 
initiator [20]. First procedurally containment injection action is in plant Emergency Operating 
Procedure (EOP) ECA-0.0 “Loss of All AC Power [21]. The basis is to establish RWST gravity flow 
to containment early enough to flood RPV if is evident that all attempts to establish decay heat 
removal by injecting into the secondary or primarily side are not successful and that core uncover is 
imminent. Also, benefit of that action is in the fact that containment pressure is low enough that 
RWST gravity drain is available. Decision for performing that action is made by Technical Support 
Center. 
Also as a part of further SUP project there will be additional availability for early RCS 
depressurization with new Pressurizer PORV bypass valves [25]. Therefore, early RCS 
depressurization could prolong vessel failure for additional 1 hour.  
So, by performing early RCS depressurization and containment flooding when there are no 
alternative means for beyond design basis accident mitigation, there is significant improvement in 
current plant chances for successful ERVC performance. 
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4.2 NPP Krško SAMG Upgrades 
Currently, NPP Krško does not use ERVC strategy for in-vessel melt retention. Nevertheless 
early containment flooding strategy for reactor cavity flooding is adopted in NPP Krško SAMG’s [8] 
for reactor cavity floor concrete protection to mitigate consequences of eventual vessel failure where 
MCCI could occur [4]. Means for containment flooding are usage of containment spray, injection 
through eventual RCS openings, or if AC power is lost - RWST gravity drain, as well as alternate 
mobile pumps, additional water sources with alternate containment injection flow paths for 
containment injection.  
Regarding further development of generic SAMG’s, containment flooding strategy to perform 
ERVC will also be used [26]. Also development of “Severe Accident Control Room Guideline - Loss 
of DC and Instrumentation” [24], proposes integrated RCS and containment flooding strategy for 
prevention of RPV failure, by application of ERVC strategy if core condition is unknown. 
 
 
Main control room initial response guideline (SACRG-1) 
 
Currently, NPP Krško SAMGs guideline SACRG-1 [8], or main control room (MCR) initial 
response to severe accident before technical support center (TSC) is activated, performs early 
containment flooding strategy to assure reactor cavity flooding up to recirculation sump level of 2 m 
[9]. Basis is reactor cavity basement floor protection [4]. Anyway, due to practically reasons, the 
operators are instructed to flood up to recirculation sump level of 3.9 m, or EOP / SAMG setpoint 
[10]; to establish containment sump level for strainers operability for usage of containment spray or 
emergency core cooling system in recirculation mode. Other actions, including attempts to inject into 
the RPV are followed later.  
For timely performance of ERVC strategy, SACRG-1 guideline is most suitable. Although 
RWST gravity drain is possible during performance of Loss of All AC Power procedure (as TSC 
evaluated action for extended loss of AC power condition), certain containment flooding as a 
operators action will be performed during SAMG’s SACRG-1 guideline for MCR.  
Usage of alternate provisions (SAME equipment) and water sources will be needed, to fill 
containment with 1440 m3. Beside 1250 m3 of RWST inventory, additional 190 m3 could be needed 
from other sources. Note that RCS and SI ACC inventory (which may or may be not spilled in sump) 
is not taken into the account (maximum 225 m3 of inventory). 
Therefore, if attempts to inject into the RPV had failed, or injection flow is insufficient to 
remove decay heat, suggestion is that SACRG-1 direct operators to establish ERVC to prevent / delay 
vessel failure, by injecting into the containment with alternative provisions.  
 
 
Technical support centre severe accident guidelines (SAG’s) 
 
NPP Krško SAMGs guidelines [8], SAG-4 “Inject into containment” and SAG-8 “Flood the 
containment“, performs strategy of injecting water into the containment by using all available means, 
as directed by technical support centre (TSC) evaluators.  
The current purposes of injection into the containment are to [8]: 
 prevent or mitigate the consequences associated with core-concrete interactions, 
 scrub fission products released from ex-vessel core debris,  
 allow ECCS recirculation (long term containment heat removal), and 
 perform external cooling of RPV lower head (SAMG’s generic [17]). 
SAG-4 is suitable for performing ex vessel cooling strategy, even if it comes somehow late per 
SAMGs diagnostic flowcharts. If previous SAG-s strategies are not successful, flooding up to new 
level of 5.6 m will also allow more confidence for retaining core inside the vessel, even if unsufficient 
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RCS injection flow is established within SAG-3 “Inject into the RCS”. EPRI SA TBR [7], notes that 
insufficient injection flow less than 29 m3/h (SAMG setpoint [F02], CA-1, [9], could accelerate core 
damage from core damage states OX/BD to EX. ERVC can assure that even for insufficient water 
injection (etc. insufficient STORE mobile pump characteristic for RCS decay heat removal with RPV 
injection), possible negative effects will be mitigated. Additionally, in combination with containment 
spray which will cool upper sections of RCS, ERVC strategy could provide more confidence in 
retaining the core inside the RPV.  
Regarding SAG-8 “Flood the containment“, this strategy is performed when reactor vessel is 
already failed, so it is not suitable for ERVC strategy. SAG-8 flooding is to the elevation of [L03] 
(4000 m3 of water) or [L03a] (9000 m3 of water).  
For containment flooding levels used in NEK SAMG [8], see Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10: NPP Krško’s CA-5 “Containment Water Level and Volume” sketch [8] with marked 
EOP and SAMG containment flooding levels [9], [10] 
 
 
4.3 Furtherer plant upgrade for ERVC performance 
As a part of Safety Upgrade Program (SUP) modification 1029-RH-L, alternate containment 
injection flowpaths for variety of mobile pump usage with ERVC applicable performances will be 
installed. Also there will be installed additional borated water water tank, dedicated for beyond design 
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NPP Krško could perform external reactor vessel cooling (ERVC) strategy with reasonable 
confidence. Total containment water inventory need for ERVC performance is 1440 m3, to cover 
bottom of reactor vessel up to elevation 99.2 m (or 5.6 m measured on containment sump level 
indicators) [27]. Strategies for performing this action for severe accident scenarios are: 
 for Loss of all AC event - RWST gravity drain (up to 1250 m3 - depending on 
containment backpressure), with additional alternate water inventory needed to be 
injected by AE equipment, and   
 for AC available events - RWST injection with ECCS (total inventory of 1010 m3) up 
to “RWST Empty” alarm (18%), with additional 430 m3 of alternate water inventory 
needed to be simultaneously injected by ECCS, DEC or AE equipment.  
If RWST gravity drain is unavailable, containment injection by alternate equipment and water 
sources will take a place. Eventually spilled and partially evaporated RCS and SI ACC inventory (in 
total 226 m3) is not taken into account. 
Per probabilistic and deterministic analysis, time window for successful ERVC strategy 
performance during severe accident occurrence (after observed CET > 650˚C) is 2.5 hours for 
TEHNNN plant damage state (PDS) scenario with 58% of total CDF participation. This action should 
be performed early after transition to Severe Accident Management Guidance (SAMG).  During loss 
of all AC power scenario leading to core damage, early containment flooding is performed before 
CET > 650˚C condition within EOP ECA-0.0 procedure, which extends time for successful strategy 
implementation. 
There are no negative effects due to ERVC performance. New flooding level will not threaten 
equipment and instrumentation needed for long term SAMGs performance or hamper the ECCS 
recirculation capabilities. Eventually diluted containment sump borated water inventory will not 
cause return to criticality during recirculation phase because of lost core geometry [7]. 
ERVC strategy will also positively interfere with other severe accident strategies regarding 
corium retention inside reactor vessel. It will supplement the effect of insufficient individual 
equipment performances needed for successful severe accident mitigation. Example is combining 
ERVC with simultaneously insufficient RCS injection and/or minor containment spraying of upper 
RCS sections.  
Changes in current NPP Krško SAMGs regarding ERVC strategy implementation could 
include: SACRG-1 “Severe Accident Control Room Guideline Initial Response”, and SAG-4 “Inject 
into Containment”.  
Regarding further development of generic SAMG’s, containment flooding strategy to perform 
ERVC will be used. Development of Severe Accident Control Room Guideline - Loss of DC and 
Instrumentation, proposes integrated RCS and containment flooding strategy for prevention of RPV 
failure, by early application of ERVC strategy if core condition is unknown. 
As a part of NPP Krško Safety Upgrade Program (SUP) modification regarding ERVC 
applicability, alternate containment injection flowpaths for AE equipment and additional borated 
water tank, will be introduced. 
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